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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
            
No. 06-4393
            
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
DEAN K. PIPER,
                             Appellant
            
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Crim. No. 01-cr-00478)
District Judge: Hon. Katharine S. Hayden
             
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
June 24, 2008
Before: SLOVITER, BARRY and ROTH, Circuit Judges
(Filed: June 30, 2008)
            
OPINION
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge.
Defendant Dean K. Piper, who pled guilty to wire fraud, appeals the award of
  The District Court explained, “when we say boilerroom,1
we’re talking about salespeople, telemarketers in a room with
phones selling investment opportunities to folks over the phone.”
App. at 44.
2
restitution entered by the District Court, claiming that there was insufficient evidence to
support $30,000 of the $295,000 restitution ordered.
I.
Amitex was a purported financial institution located in the Bahamas.  It ostensibly
financed the purchase of tangible commodities solicited through telemarketing boiler
rooms  located throughout the United States in exchange for various fees.  Between late1
1997 until March 1998 Piper owned and operated an Amitex boiler room named Franklin
Asset Management Corporation (“FAMC”) in Keyport, New Jersey.  FAMC obtained a
handful of customers, including Tom Beetstra.  In March 1998, Piper created the World
Bullion Exchange, which was a scam like FAMC.  He used it to defraud Beetstra and
another individual named Michael Bongo.
On July 20, 2001, Piper pled guilty to a one-count information charging him with
wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343.  The parties entered into a plea agreement, in
which Piper agreed to cooperate against other individuals involved in the scheme.  The
parties initially stipulated that the amount of loss attributable to Piper was more than
$120,000 but less than $200,000.  In the Pre-Sentence Investigation Report, the Probation
Office calculated the loss attributable to Piper to be $265,300, to which the parties then
3stipulated at sentencing.
Thereafter, the District Court heard testimony from Beetstra in which he testified
that the stipulated amount did not include two additional $15,000 payments he had made
to Piper.  He provided no documentary evidence to substantiate the $30,000 loss.  No
corroborating evidence was found in Piper’s records, even though he had provided his
records regarding his fraudulent business, nor was there any corroboration in Piper’s
banking records that the government had seized.
Although Beetstra could not remember the date of the payments, he testified that
he was “sure of the payment,” App. at 32, because he stated that he had kept a written
tally in his pocket.  When asked by the Court if he currently had that piece of paper,
Beetstra said, “No.  I don’t know if I did have one.  I sent that to the government.”  App.
at 37.  There was some dispute whether the government had ever received such a tally. 
Beetstra, however, insisted that he made those payments:
THE COURT: What makes you know for sure you made
those payments?
MR. BEETSTRA: I can recall the numbers.  I can recall the
numbers that I’m up to a quarter of a million; I am up to a
quarter of a million I kept telling myself.  I remember it being
that high.  I just know it was that high.  I can recall now that
the number was huge.
App. at 37.
Beetstra testified he had made those payments via wire transfer, but could not
provide verification because his bank told him that it does not keep wire transfer records.
4After Beetstra’s testimony, the District Court gave Piper the opportunity to question
Beetstra, but Piper’s counsel declined to ask any questions or engage in any cross-
examination.
The Court was evidently troubled in considering the amount of restitution to
award.  It commented as follows:
THE COURT: The Court is presented with a somewhat
difficult problem.  And restitution is always difficult. 
Ultimately the Court is pretty much left to making a
determination on its own.
App. at 40-41.
After additional colloquy, the Court stated,
I am no different than a juror, one finally asks oneself if the
proofs are not as crystal clear as everybody would like,
particularly where we are talking about, I know I did, but I
can’t show you the pieces of paper, we say why would this
person lie?  And I really have to come down to why would
Mr. Beetstra, in telling Mr. Barrett, this is what I lost, here’s
what I’ve got, why would Mr. Beetstra be saying in all
candor, I know what I lost, and it’s $222,300 and I made two
$15,000 payments at times and I can not remember, but I
know that I made them and I know they were $15,000.  And
quite frankly, it strikes me as credible testimony . . .  [T]he
absence of records is affecting both sides.  It was a long time
ago.  It was eight years ago and more, and I am finding
credible Mr. Beetstra’s claim that the amount of loss, the
amount of payment to Mr. Piper is an extra $30,000.
App. at 49.
After finding Beetstra’s testimony to be credible, the Court increased Piper’s
restitution amount by $30,000.  The final restitution order was for $295,300; $222,300 to
  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 182
U.S.C. § 3742(a).
5
be paid to Beetstra and the balance to Bongo.
Piper does not dispute that $265,300 in loss was properly attributed to him for
purposes of restitution.  Rather, his appeal is limited to his claim that the additional
$30,000 was not a proven loss, and that the District Court abused its discretion in finding
that it was.2
II.
Restitution is limited to the amount of actual loss suffered by the victims of a
defendant’s conduct.  United States v. Vitillo, 490 F.3d 314, 330 (3d Cir. 2007).  “The
burden of demonstrating the amount of loss is on the government, and any dispute
regarding the proper amount is to be resolved by a preponderance of the evidence.”  Id.
(citing 18 U.S.C. § 3664(e)).  We review the District Court’s factual finding regarding the
amount of loss for clear error.  Id. (citing United States v. Akande, 200 F.3d 136, 138 (3d
Cir. 1999)).  To establish clear error in this case, Piper would have to show that the
$30,000 addition to the restitution figure is “‘completely devoid of a credible evidentiary
basis or bears no rational relationship to the supporting data.’” Id. (quoting United States
v. Haut, 107 F.3d 213, 218 (3d Cir. 1997)).
Notwithstanding that the only evidence to prove the $30,000 loss is Beetstra’s
uncorroborated self-serving testimony, we cannot conclude that the District Court’s
  The government argues that we should review Piper’s3
claim for plain error because he did not properly preserve his
objection.  Because of our ultimate disposition, it is not necessary
to resolve that issue.
6
decision that the $30,000 constituted an additional loss is “completely devoid of a
credible evidentiary basis.”  Id. (citation and internal quotations omitted).  The District
Court was in the best position to judge Beetstra’s credibility.  After all, the Court took the
sworn testimony of Beetstra, and questioned him about the basis for his knowledge and
why he had no supporting documentation.  The Court gave both parties an opportunity to
question Beetstra, which they declined.  Although the evidence was not overwhelming,
the District Court did not clearly err in determining the amount of loss.  See Nara v.
Frank, 488 F.3d 187, 201 (3d Cir. 2007) (stating that in “‘doubtful cases’” district court’s
power of observation is often the most accurate way to ascertain the truth) (citation
omitted).
III.
For the above-stated reasons, we will affirm the judgment of conviction and
sentence.3
